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Allies in Complicity: The United States, Canada,
and the Clayton Knight Committee’s Clandestine
Recruiting of Americans for the Royal Canadian Air
Force, 1940-1942
RACHEL LEA HEIDE
The training of pilots and air crew in the British Commonwealth Air TrainingPlan (BCATP) was one of the most important contributions Canada made
to the Allied air war.  In an effort to get the schools running and graduating
recruits as quickly as possible, Canada gladly accepted foreign instructors and
trainees interested in helping fight the Axis powers before their home states
officially became belligerents in the war.  Between June 1940 and January
1942, over 49,000 thousand American pilots and would-be air recruits
answered the Royal Canadian Air Force’s surreptitious call for American
nationals to help with Canada’s Second World War air effort.  The tale of the
Clayton Knight Committee involved a Canadian oil company heir and a promi-
nent American aviation artist with extensive personal connections.  The
escapade also involved the air force deliberately remaining at arm’s length so
as to be able to reap the benefits of the Clayton Knight Committee’s activities
without actually violating American neutrality laws.  The venture had blessings
from the Chief of the United States Army Air Corps and America’s Head of the
Navy Bureau of Aeronautics as well, and the committee even had expert legal
advice from the American State Department as to how the law could be
stretched safely.
Despite the intrigue, dash, and daring-do of the nineteen-month campaign
to bring American men into the BCATP, historians have treated the Clayton
Knight Committee as little more than a mere episode, not worthy of mention
(as in American Second World War air power literature), or they have relegated
it to a few pages or an appendix (as in Canadian works on the BCATP).1 In
1 Notable monographs covering the evolution of American air power are not concerned with for-
eign relations with neighbours and allies; focussing instead on the development of strategic
bombing and independent air force doctrine, the inter-service rivalry between an army in
favour of a separate air force and a navy not wanting to lose its marine corps or aviation assets,
and the eventual establishment of the third service, the United States Air Force.  See Herman
S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.:
USAF Office of Air Force History, 1984); Toward Independence: The Emergence of the US 
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fact, this behind-the-scenes, clandestine recruiting scheme says volumes about
the Canadian government’s courage to push the envelope and about the
American administration’s desire to circumvent the strict interpretation of that
country’s neutrality laws.
When Canada’s Prime Minister W.L.M. King signed the BCATP
Agreement2 on 17 December 1939, he thought he had found the perfect solution
to the fears of conscription becoming an immediate consequence of Canada’s
entry into the Second World War.  Canadians running the pilot and aircrew train-
ing schools would remain on Canadian soil.  Trainees actually being sent
overseas after graduation would either be young men from Australia, New
Zealand, and Great Britain, or Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) members who
volunteered; hence, conscription need not be an issue.  By spring 1940, pilot,
observer, gunner, wireless operator, bomber, navigator, and flight engineer
trainees began attending the schools which were built in every Canadian
province.  Eventually, 131,533 air force personnel – from Canada, the British
Air Force 1945-1947 (Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996); The
Struggle for Air Force Independence 1943-1947 (Washington: Air Force History and
Museums Program, 1997); and Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval
Aviation 1945-1950 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994). Even Colonel Stanley W.
Dziuban’s Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945 (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959) does not men-
tion the Clayton Knight Committee nor any American concerns over Canada’s recruiting
below the 49th parallel. Dziuban does mention Canada’s request of May 1940 to send Canadian
air trainees to American facilities, but this request was rejected because “such facilities were
being fully utilized to meet US needs, and, furthermore, that any such step would violate the
Hague Convention” (10).  Dziuban acknowledges that Americans came to Canada to join all
three Canadian services, and he also notes that a substantial number of Americans in the Royal
Canadian Air Force were instructing in BCATP schools (241-2).  Nonetheless, he makes no
mention of how these men heard about the Plan, how they were directed to Canadian recruit-
ing offices, or how the two countries negotiated these men’s participation in a foreign military
service. Academic works on the BCATP are few (most monographs are written by amateur his-
torians, journalists, or veterans themselves, and these focus on biographical accounts, specific
training adventures or mishaps, and the eventual reaching of the battlefield).  Two Canadian
historians, both affiliated with the Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History
and Heritage, have given a small amount of attention to the Clayton Knight Committee in their
wider works.  Both of these historians have described the committee’s goals and accomplish-
ments, and both have discussed – to some extent – the committee’s run-ins with American
authorities.  Neither author puts the Clayton Knight Committee episode into the greater con-
text of foreign relations between Canada and the United States.  See W.A.B. Douglas, et. al.,
The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force: Volume II: The Creation of National Air
Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); and F.J. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy:
Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian
Government Printing Centre, 1983); “Recruiting Americans for the Royal Canadian Air Force
1939-1942” in Aerospace Historian 18.1 (Spring-March 1971).
2 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, National Archives of Canada (NAC) RG 25 Volume
1858A File 72-T-38.
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Commonwealth, and German occupied nations in Europe – graduated from the
BCATP. Although the United States of America did not signed the BCATP
Agreement and become an official participant, Canada’s southern neighbour
made a significant contribution to the successful operation of the training plan:
American pilots came to Canada to work as instructors and staff pilots.  During
the manpower shortage of 1941 and the consequent decline in Canadian air
recruits passing through the plan, American men interested in become air crew
for the RCAF or the Royal Air Force (RAF) were permitted by the F.D.
Roosevelt Administration to come to Canada, train, and join foreign militaries.
Canada was able to secure American pilots and air crew trainees through the
work of the Clayton Knight Committee (CKC), despite the United States’ neu-
trality and laws against recruiting American citizens for foreign armed services.
This not only provides insight into Canadian-American relations during the
Second World War crisis, but it also is very revealing of the two governments’
attitudes.  Despite having to conduct a recruiting campaign through clandestine
means and having to constantly be in tune with American diplomatic concerns,
the Canadian government and air force were determined to keep a steady flow
of American airmen coming into the BCATP.  The American administration,
while apparently tolerating the CKC’s blatant circumvention of American laws,
was more than happy to allow the CKC to function virtually uninhibited as a
means of circumventing Congressional and public opinion and hence supporting
the Allied war effort while their hands were officially tied.
The CKC was the brain-child of William Avery Bishop (the Canadian fly-
ing ace of First World War fame).  Even before war was declared, Bishop was
considering possible sources of experienced pilots for Canada’s war effort.
During the First World War, American airmen had been eager to participate in
combat before the United States entered the war.  Bishop assumed the same
interest would be shown again, and he believed that an organization should be
established in the U.S. to inform these airmen as to the openings available with
the RCAF, the minimum qualifications demanded of the volunteers, and the
paperwork applicants should bring with them.  By counseling these men before
they left home and crossed the border into Canada, Bishop aimed to avoid hav-
ing Americans undertake expensive trips only to find themselves unqualified,
rejected, and financially destitute in a foreign country.  Bishop visited the White
House in March 1939 and was given the impression that the barriers to recruit-
ing Americans for the RCAF could be overcome.3
3 Douglas, 632-3; Hatch, 87; “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of
Activities of the Clayton Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau,”
Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) File 181.003 (D3639); “Contribution to Victory, 1939-
1942” by Clayton Knight, DHH File 80/68 Part 2; 27 September 1944 letter, Beatrice Thomas
(Secretary CKC) to Robert Hinckley, DHH File 80/68 Part 45; Undated Press Release, DHH File
80/68 Part 46; 30 June 1942 letter, Clayton Knight to Bogart Rogers, DHH File 80/68 Part 47.
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With this encouragement, the former ace4 began soliciting possible part-
ners for this organization to screen American airmen interested in flying for
Canada.  He contacted Homer Smith – a Canadian who had been living in the
U.S. for many years, a former member of the Royal Naval Air Service during
the First World War – to see if he would be willing to donate his time and
money: Smith “was the happy executor of a personal family fortune that
stemmed from the Imperial Oil Company of Canada.”  Smith was glad to coop-
erate, and he immediately began contacting airline presidents, flying school
owners, and Civil Aeronautics Authority officials.5
Once war was declared by Great Britain on 3 September 1939, Bishop
approached Clayton Knight as another possible key player in this organization.
Knight was an aviation artist, but he was also an American airmen who had
flown with the British during the First World War; additionally, he had exten-
sive ties to aviation circles in the United States.  Bishop asked him on 4
September, “what do you think of the possibilities of Americans wanting to
come up to Canada and help out with the Commonwealth Air Training Plan?”
Knight believed that the interest amongst American airmen would be high, and
he offered to canvas his network of contacts to provide a more definitive
answer.6
Government and RCAF interest in securing American expertise did not
begin until the end of the Phoney War, which was brought about in the spring
of 1940 by Germany’s incredible territorial gains on the European continent.
As the Allies scrambled to regroup from this unexpected turn of events, the
very existence of the BCATP – only in its infancy – was threatened: it was
nearly shut-down so that all available pilots could immediately be sent to help
combat the Germans in the Battle of Britain.  After much deliberation,
Canada chose to not sacrifice future air war contributions for the present
needs; instead of suspending the BCATP, its schedule was accelerated, and
Canada began producing more graduates on a monthly basis than was origi-
nally projected.  This acceleration and expansion of training meant that more
instructors were needed, but the source of already trained pilots with suffi-
4 After the First World War, Bishop was no longer officially affiliated with the RCAF.
Commercial aviation and foreign business interests pre-occupied his inter-war career.  During
the Second World War, his RCAF Air Vice Marshal rank was honourary.  With this, he was
able to lend his fame to recruiting and morale-building campaigns.  His First World War fame,
Victoria Cross, and wife’s financial connections made him well known to both Canadian and
American aviation communities. Personal correspondence with S.E. Dieter (former Historian
with The Billy Bishop Heritage Museum in Owen Sound, Ontario).
5 Ibid.; quote from “Contribution to Victory, 1939-1942” by Clayton Knight, DHH File 80/68
Part 2.
6 Ibid.; quote from 17 June 1965 interview with Clayton Knight by Major Robert Hays (USAF),
DHH File 80/68 Part 3.
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cient experience to teach a new generation or to serve as staff pilots in the
schools for observers, bombers, gunners, and navigators had already been
exhausted.7
A special meeting of the RCAF’s Air Council was called in May 1940.
Representatives of the major airlines attended this meeting which aimed to
determine how many more experienced pilots could be brought into an
expanded BCATP.  Homer Smith and Clayton Knight were present as well and
listened as the air force was told by the airlines that less than twenty-five air-
men could be spared for work in the BCATP.  Knight seized the opportunity to
gain the RCAF’s support for the idea of securing the services of American
pilots.  After the war, Knight reminisced, “in the heavy silence that followed
this grim evaluation, heads were turned curiously in my direction when I stated,
‘Homer Smith and I have an initial list of slightly over three hundred pilots who
are willing to come up to help.’”8
Despite initial skepticism, the RCAF agreed to use Bishop, Knight, and
Smith’s pre-existing organization to tap into this desperately needed source of
pilots.  On 31 May 1940, Wing Commander W.A. Curtis sent a proposal to the
RCAF’s Air Staff requesting permission to have Wing Commander Homer
Smith9 procure one hundred pilots in the United States; Smith would oversee
the organization to “interview pilots and issue them, where necessary, with rail-
way fare and traveling expenses to headquarters in Ottawa.”  Curtis also
proposed advancing Smith $5,000.00 to help with expenses.10 The following
day, Air Commodore J.S. Breadner (Chief of the Air Staff) forwarded this pro-
posal to the Deputy Minister for Air:
To implement the government’s decision concerning the acceleration of the
Joint Air Training Plan, additional instructional staff will be required forthwith
... Wing Commander Smith, since the commencement of the war, discreetly
and carefully explored the American field, and has an organization in that
country that will under his supervision interview the candidates.  Those
selected would be issued railway fare and traveling expenses to RCAF head-
quarters Ottawa for final interview and disposition.11
7 Douglas, 633; “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF Personnel
History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7.
8 Douglas, 633; quote from “Contribution to Victory, 1939-1942” by Clayton Knight, DHH File
80/68 Part 2.
9 He had been commissioned into the RCAF and put on the reserve list by Defence Minister Ian
Mackenzie on 9 September 1939.
10 Douglas, 633;  31 May 1940 memorandum, W/C WA Curtis to Air Member for Personnel,
NAC RG 24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-2.
11 1 June 1940 memorandum, A/C J.S. Breadner (Chief of the Air Staff) to J.S. Duncan (Acting
Deputy Minister of Defence for Air), NAC RG 24 Volume 5358 File 45-10-2.
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The CKC was authorized by the Canadian government to provide infor-
mation to American pilots wanting to help Canada and Britain’s war effort.  The
committee would ensure that these men had all the requisite documents before
they crossed the border into Canada.  Officially, the committee was trying to fill
civilian instructor and staff pilot vacancies in the BCATP’s Air Observer
Schools and Elementary Flying Training Schools.  Because these positions did
not require the pilots to be members of the RCAF, the U.S. government could
not accuse the Canadians of recruiting Americans into a foreign armed service.
Nonetheless, the committee did have information available about the air force,
and committee members, as well as the Canadian and American governments,
knew that pilots, once in Canada, often opted for the glamour of donning the
RCAF uniform instead of serving as civilians.12
Candidates needed to be between eighteen and forty-five years old; they
required the equivalent of a high school education, 300 hours flying time, and
a Civil Aeronautics Authority license.  These qualifications were less strict than
those for the American military air services.  In the United States, volunteers
had to have a minimum of two years’ university training, and eyesight had to
be 20/20 without glasses.  Canada accepted airmen whose 20/40 vision was
correctable to 20/20 with glasses.  The RCAF would also accept married men;
the United States’ air forces would not.  Because of the difference in qualifica-
tions, the CKC was not competing with America’s army and naval air services;
a pool of men interested in aviation – but unable to meet American standards –
existed, and they were eager to try their luck in Canada.13
Once an airmen passed the medical examination, flying test, and personal
interview, he would be sent to Canada for more tests; while in Canada awaiting
acceptance or rejection, his hotel expenses would be covered (usually at the
Chateau Laurier in Ottawa), and he would be given a $5 per diem living
allowance.  There was a wide variety of employment options for the American
pilot.  He could retain his civilian status by working at an Elementary Flying
Training School as a flying instructor or at an Air Observer School as a staff
pilot.  Many Americans preferred joining the RCAF; in this case, they would
instruct at a Service Flying Training School or become a staff pilot flying non-
pilot air crew trainees at a Bombing and Gunnery School.  American pilots
could also help the RAF by ferrying planes across the Atlantic from North
12 Douglas, 635; 17 June 1965 interview with Clayton Knight by Major Robert Hays (USAF),
DHH File 80/68 Part 3; April 1941 Clayton Knight Committee General Regulations, DHH File
80/68 Part 28; 27 May 1941 Press Release, DHH File 80/68 Part 46.
13 Douglas, 635;  “Seek Pilots Here to Fly Warplanes Across Atlantic,” Minneapolis Tribune, 6
January 1941, DHH File 80/68 Part 50; “Contribution to Victory, 1939-1942” by Clayton
Knight, DHH File 80/68 Part 2; 17 June 1965 interview with Clayton Knight by Major Robert
Hays (USAF), DHH File 80/68 Part 3.
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American manufacturers or by ferrying planes from British factories to
squadrons in the theatres of war.14
CKC offices were set-up in luxury hotels across the U.S. and Canada.  The
headquarters was at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York City.  Other
branches were located in Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Hollywood,
Kansas City, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Oakland, Portland, St Louis, San
Antonio, San Francisco, Spokane, and Washington DC.  Five offices were
established in Canada – Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Windsor, and Vancouver –
to help American candidates find accommodations while in Canada and to
assist those returning home after rejection.15
In initiating the campaign and organization to procure American pilots,
Canadian officials were very conscientious in making sure American authori-
ties were aware of the committee’s actions and intentions; the Canadian
government even put specific measures in place to ensure that American con-
cerns over recruitment laws and oaths of allegiance were accommodated.
Members of the CKC discussed their plans with Major-General H.H. Arnold
(Chief of the United States Army Air Corps) and Rear-Admiral J.H. Towers
(Head of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics) as early as March 1940.  Both men
were supportive of the committee’s efforts; they felt that there was no need for
the American services to feel threatened because there was indeed a large pool
of talent who had failed to meet the very strict standards of the United States’
air forces.  Major-General Arnold told Knight that many good airmen had been
released from his air service because of technicalities – they had gotten drunk
or had conducted some low stunt flying, or it was discovered that they were
married.  In addition to informing Knight of these available men, Arnold also
offered to provide the committee with a list of failed candidates.  Knight’s cour-
teous inquiries were met with generous and reassuring support.16
The Department of External Affairs also approached the southern neigh-
bour’s State Department to gauge its reaction to Canada’s bringing American
men into its war effort.  On 18 May 1940, O.D. Skelton (Under Secretary of
State for External Affairs) received the State Department’s response to the
Canadian diplomatic inquiries:  the ‘highest quarters’ concluded “United States
authorities will not be embarrassed by the enlistment in Canada of United
States citizens who proceed to Canada for that purpose.”  The only request was
that American citizens would not be required to take an oath of allegiance to
14 Hatch, 89; “Seek Pilots Here to Fly Warplanes Across Atlantic” in Minneapolis Tribune, 6
January 1941, DHH File 80/68 Part 50.
15 Douglas, 634; Undated letter (first page missing), DHH File 80/68 Part 11.
16 Douglas, 634; 19 March 1940 letter, Major-General HH Arnold (Chief of the U.S. Army Air
Corps) to Clayton Knight, DHH File 80/68 Part 9; “Contribution to Victory, 1939-1942” by
Clayton Knight, DHH File 80/68 Part 2; 17 June 1965 interview with Clayton Knight by Major
Robert Hays (USAF), DHH File 80/68 Part 3.
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another head of state, for this would cost the airmen their American citizen-
ship.17 Skelton had approached the Deputy Minister for Air about this
complication earlier on 4 May 1940.  He explained the problematic conse-
quences of forcing foreign nationals to take the oath of allegiance upon entering
the Canadian armed forces:
Under the laws of the United States of America, the taking of an oath of alle-
giance resulted in the forfeiture of United States citizenship ... It is ... possible
that there will be at the conclusion of the war thousands of members of the
Canadian armed forces who will be stateless and who will present a very seri-
ous problem from the domestic point of view and from the point of view of
the external relations of this government.
Skelton suggested the creation of an oath that did “not involve allegiance
and consequently forfeiture of national status.”18 According to the military’s
Judge Advocate General, removal of the oath of allegiance created neither
administrative nor disciplinary problems:
From a purely legal point of view, insofar as the Department of National
Defence is concerned, I should not suppose that it would make any material
difference whether or not the individual took an oath of allegiance ... The
result is that by accepting appointment to, or engagement to, serve in the
armed forces, the individual places himself under, and is susceptible to, all the
obligations which the laws relating to the service concerned impose.19
The Chief of the Air Staff would not oppose the removal of the oath for foreign
nationals, although he did express his “personal regret, which I feel will be
shared by many, that tradition and custom have been discarded.”20 The oath of
allegiance was replaced by an oath of obedience to superior officers.
The CKC was set up as a civilian information agency for the express pur-
pose of keeping the Department of National Defence from being directly
involved in securing Americans for Canada’s air force.  American authorities
knew that the CKC was helping the RCAF, but since it appeared as though the
Canadian government was in keeping with the letter of American law, this
diplomatic fiction was tolerated.  Unfortunately, members of the CKC got too
17 Douglas, 634; Hatch, 87; 18 May 1940 telegram, Canadian Minister to O.D. Skelton (Under
Secretary of State for External Affairs), NAC RG 24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-2.
18 4 May 1940 letter, O.D. Skelton to JS Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence
for Air), NAC RG 24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-2.
19 8 May 1940 letter, Judge Advocate General to Adjutant-General, NAC RG 24 Volume 5368
File 45-10-2.
20 16 May 1940 memorandum, Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of the Air Staff) to J.S. Duncan
(Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), NAC RG 24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-2.
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zealous in their attempts to acquire American pilots.  This, in conjunction with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiry, the discovery that Homer
Smith was on the RCAF reserve list, and the fact that the committee was pro-
viding funds to cover candidates’ travel expenses, alarmed the State
Department.  Nevertheless, the State Department raised the issue with Canada’s
Department of External Affairs not to shut the committee down, but for the
express purpose of ensuring that the committee remained within American laws
so that it could continue to function and avoid prosecution.
On 4 November, John D. Hickerson (Assistant Chief of the State
Department’s Division of European Affairs and Secretary of the American
Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence)21 met with Loring Christie
(the Canadian Minister to the U.S.) to voice complaints about the conduct of the
Clayton Knight and Homer Smith:  these two men had put “the political side of
the State Department ... in a somewhat embarrassing position.”  Complaints about
Knight and Smith’s activities were being received from “official quarters”; the
committee was attracting too much publicity; the FBI was investigating the com-
mittee’s actions; travel loans to potential candidates were usually not repaid (thus
making them gifts in reality); Homer Smith was not only receiving pay cheques
from the Canadian government, but he was also not the private citizen he claimed
to be, seeing as he was on the RCAF reserve list.  The State Department had no
difficulty in having the CKC inform applicants before going to Canada about the
availability of jobs with the BCATP and about the qualifications airmen had to
meet to secure one of these positions.  Unfortunately, the financial conduct of the
committee and Smith’s status with the RCAF raised two troubling legal ques-
tions.  Providing funds for an Americans to join a foreign armed service was a
violation of the law against recruiting U.S. nationals.  Furthermore, being a mem-
ber of the RCAF meant that Smith might also be violating the law which
necessitated the registration of agents working for foreign governments.
According to Hickerson, “these features would not jibe well with the ostensible
picture that Mssrs Knight and Smith are simply public-spirited or patriotic private
persons doing what they can to help Canada and the Allied cause.”  A further
complication arose from the fact that the committee was very “close to advertis-
ing the organization’s existence and purpose.”  The volume of correspondence
between the committee and possible applicants was ever increasing, and the com-
mittee was even asking other flight related organizations to direct potential
applicants to the CKC and its Canadian jobs for the war effort.22
21 Dziuban, 32; According to Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, Hickerson “had done a tour of
duty at the American Legation in Ottawa during the twenties ... [H]e was ... a good friend of
Canada about which he was always extremely well informed.”  Soldiers and Politicians: The
Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 162.
22 4 November 1940 letter, L.C. Christie (Canadian Minister to the United States) to O.D.
Skelton, NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379 Reel T-1794 pp. 8-15.
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The State Department did not ask for the CKC to be terminated.  Instead,
Hickerson – with his actions and his advice – clearly aimed to keep the com-
mittee from being closed-down by other American authorities for breaking the
law.  In the meeting with Hickerson, Christie was informed that no memoran-
dum of their conversation would be made for State Department records.
Despite the fact that Smith was a member of the RCAF, Hickerson intervened
on behalf of the CKC in the matter of registering government agents:
The branch of the State Department which registers agents of foreign govern-
ments have learned of the operations of the Knight-Smith organization and
have raised the question whether it ought not to be registered under the Act
requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals and of foreign gov-
ernments ... Mr Hickerson ... has persuaded this branch not to press the matter
on the ground that Mssrs Knight and Smith state that they are acting as private
persons and not as agents of the Canadian government.
Hickerson then suggested to Christie that the committee should employ “a
wide-awake practical lawyer who could constantly advise them about what
risks they were running of violating the laws.”  This State Department official
had no intention of prosecuting or closing down the CKC; he was merely cau-
tioning Knight and Smith to “‘slow down and pull in their horns.’”23
On 12 November, a legal adviser for the Canadian government wrote to
Prime Minister King, confirming that the CKC was obviously financed by
Canada’s government.  Nonetheless, despite the technical breeches of
American neutrality laws, the legal adviser did not consider this to be a very
serious matter.  The committee’s accomplishments were great – it had secured
American airmen to fly bombers across the Atlantic for the RAF, and it had fur-
nished instructors for the BCATP.  This success fueled the air force’s
determination to keep the scheme alive.  If American public opinion did even-
tually sour, then the legal adviser proposed, “it should be possible to dissolve
the committee and start again, if necessary, in a different way and under a dif-
ferent name.”24
Despite the legal adviser’s nonchalant approach to the matter, the Cabinet
War Committee initially reacted adversely to the State Department’s communi-
cations.  In its 19 November meeting, the Cabinet War Committee discussed its
concern over the CKC’s overt advertising in newspapers.  The CKC was only
mandated “to give information to would-be recruits for the RCAF.”  Although
American authorities were not opposed to the committee’s existence, and
23 Ibid.
24 12 November 1940 note from Legal Adviser to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, Document 33 in
David R. Murray, ed, Documents on Canadian External Relations [DCER] Volume 8 1939-
1941 (Ottawa:  Department of External Affairs, 1976), 52-3.
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despite the fact that the FBI had given the CKC “a clean bill of health,” Prime
Minister King and his Cabinet did not want to embarrass the U.S. government.
President Roosevelt had told King “that recruiting in the United States would
constitute a serious embarrassment to the administration,” and King had
promised that Canada would not be undertaking a recruiting mission in the bor-
ders of its neutral neighbour.  Much to the dismay of Cabinet, “recruiting was,
in fact, being carried on, and ... such activities could not be regarded as in keep-
ing with his [King’s] understanding with the President”  Because the
government did not want to support – either directly or indirectly – recruiting
in the U.S., the Cabinet War Committee directed the Minister of National
Defence for Air “to see the immediate discontinuance of the activities of the
Clayton Knight Committee.”25
The Acting Deputy Minister for Air (J.S. Duncan) wasted no time reacting
to the proposed closure of the CKC.  Coming to the committee’s defence on 21
November, Duncan stressed the importance of this supply of pilots for the
BCATP.  To date, over 300 pilots were contributing to the air training plan.
They were experienced, required only short refresher courses, and would be
very difficult to replace: “Their securing these men had been an essential fac-
tor in the speeding up of the whole scheme, and further recruits from this source
had been counted on for continued development.”  Duncan challenged the deci-
sion to terminate the committee: since no adverse comments had been made in
the American press, why was such remedial action being taken, especially
when the FBI had deemed the committee’s activities acceptable?26
The concerns of Deputy Minister Duncan and members of the RCAF were
brought to the attention of the Cabinet War Committee on 22 November.  These
men heard how the U.S. army and navy held no objections to Canada’s secur-
ing the services of American pilots for the war effort; the United Kingdom was
openly recruiting Americans, and United States citizens were being trained in
American army schools for service with the RAF.  The Cabinet War Committee
agreed to approach the State Department and ask directly “whether the US gov-
ernment had any objection to the activities such as those of the Clayton Knight
Committee.”27 Under Secretary of State Skelton wrote the Canadian Legation
in Washington on 25 November, requesting that the importance of the CKC be
expressed to the State Department: the BCATP would be hampered if this
source of pilots were discontinued; no negative comments had arisen out of the
wide publicity that the committee had created; senior air officers in Washington
approved of the Canadian scheme; the FBI took no exception to the commit-
25 19 November 1940 Extract of Cabinet War Committee Minutes, Document 34 in DCER 8, 53-5.
26 21 November 1940 memorandum, O.D. Skelton,  NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379 Reel 
T-1794, 29-32; also in NAC MG 26 J4 Volume 382 Reel H-1548, 268447-40.
27 22 November 1940 Extract of Cabinet War Committee Minutes, Document 36 in DCER 8, 57-8.
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tee’s activities; and terminating the committee’s work for the RCAF might also
hurt the work it was doing in securing pilots for the RAF.  Once these points
were brought to the attention of the State Department, Skelton wanted the
Canadian Legation to ask, “if there are any special phases of the past or present
operations of the Clayton Knight group as to which special difficulty is felt.”28
The Canadian Chargé d’Affaires reported his findings to Skelton on 27
November.  The State Department was told that “the [Canadian] government
would like to be sure that the administration is now definitely of the opinion
that the activities of the committee are embarrassing and should be terminated.”
Hickerson replied that “the Administration does not want to say that the activ-
ities should be terminated and has never asked that they should be terminated.”
Hickerson then reiterated the actions that the State Department had taken in
support of the CKC.  Enquires from private individuals about the committee’s
activities were being “given a good meaningless bureaucratic answer.”  The
State Department was not requesting that the committee be registered as an
agent of the Canadian government.  Hickerson also advised that a critical exam-
ination of the committee’s conduct be done and that this study be reviewed by
an American legal adviser; Dean Acheson’s name was recommended.29 The
State Department’s discussions with the Canadian Legation revealed that the
‘highest quarters’ actually expected the CKC to go beyond merely providing
information.  When Jay Pierrepont Moffat (Chief of the State Department’s
Western European Affairs Division) informed the Canadians on 18 May 1940
that the U.S. Administration would not be embarrassed if Americans went to
Canada for the express purpose of enlisting in the Canadian forces, he also
wrote a secret communication to Sumner Welles (Assistant Secretary of State)
expressing acceptance of a more pro-active role for the CKC:
Now, if Mr Mackenzie King wished to adopt a more liberal policy and to indi-
cate in some careful manner (without of course indicating in any way that the
matter had been discussed with American authorities) that Americans of
proper age, who, of their own volition, came to Canada and desired to join the
air corps or other fighting forces, would not be automatically turned down,
this would not be embarrassing to Washington.30
28 25 November 1940 letter, O.D. Skelton to M.M. Mahoney (Canadian Legation in Washington),
NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379 Reel T-1794, 37-9; also in NAC MG 26 J4 Volume 382 Reel
H-1548, 268431-3.
29 27 November 1940 Letter, Chargé d=Affaires to O.D. Skelton, NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File
379 Reel T-1794, 41-8; also in NAC MG 26 J4 Volume 382 Reel H-1548, 268435-6.  Acheson
was Under-Secretary of the Treasury in 1933.  Then this lawyer became Assistant Secretary of
State from 1941-5, Under-Secretary of State from 1945-7, and Secretary of State from 1949-
53.
30 Ibid.
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Hickerson was aware of how borderline the CKC’s activities were.  He
hinted that the committee should “get rid of a certain amount of its incriminat-
ing correspondence in case its files are investigated.”  Hickerson feigned
ignorance as to the exact workings of the committee: “The Department of State
does not know much about the inner workings of the committee, and they do
not want to know more than they at present know.”  Nonetheless, Hickerson
knew enough about the committee to advise that it cease lending travel money
to potential recruits; he also advised that the advertising be discontinued.  The
committee needed to be more circumspect in its conduct.31 After being in con-
tact with Adolf Berle (Assistant Secretary of State, an official “next to Mr
Welles in the State Department and very closely in touch with the President”),32
Hickerson spoke with the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires again.  Berle agreed with
Hickerson “whole heartedly”.  The activities of the CKC need not be termi-
nated.  The Canadian government was asked to make sure that the committee
stayed within the law.  The CKC should get “the advice of a friendly United
States lawyer with the ‘instinct of an ambulance chaser’ ... [someone] who
would be able to stretch the law a little.”  Canada’s scheme to secure American
pilots for Canadian service was accepted; the State Department simply wanted
the committee to be less “‘careless.’”33
On 18 December 1940, Skelton wrote Prime Minister King, conveying the
legal advice that had been given – free of charge – by Dean Acheson.  Acheson
confirmed that existing laws made recruiting on American soil against the law.
Nevertheless, “there would be no objection to men being engaged in the United
States for a civil task.  If later, when in Canada, some of them wished to join
the RCAF and were accepted, no objection could be taken provided it was not
done in such a way as to make it appear a colourable evasion.”  Consequently,
in its determination to prolong American tolerance of its procurement of pilots,
the Department of National Defence for Air devised a new organization that
would take Acheson’s advice to heart.34 Privy Council Order 739 (of 31
January 1941) brought the Dominion Aeronautical Association Limited (DAA)
into existence – a Crown Corporation that would keep the RCAF one step
removed from the activities of the CKC.  The committee was given the duty of
acting as an agent of the DAA in the United States; it had the mandate of secur-
ing eligible pilots for “civilian employment in Canada in connection with the
31 Ibid.
32 30 November 1940 letter, O.D. Skelton to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air),
NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379 Reel T-1794, 52; also in NAC MG 26 J4 Volume 382 Reel
H-1548, 268463.
33 3 December 1940 letter, Chargé d=Affaires to O.D. Skelton, NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379
Reel T-1794, 53; also in NAC MG 26 J4 Volume 382 Reel H-1548, 268466.
34 18 December 1940 memorandum, O.D. Skelton to W.L.M. King (Secretary of State for
External Affairs), NAC RG 25 Volume 779 File 379 Reel T-1794, 60-1.
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British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.”  Because the official focus was on
civilian employment, it could be argued that the committee was not breaking
American laws.  Conveniently, though, the DAA office in Ottawa was situated
next door to the RCAF headquarters.  Hence, if civilian jobs happened to be
‘unavailable’, DAA officials simply advised applicants to go next door to see
what might be open in the RCAF.35
Canadian determination to stretch the law and American support for the
CKC’s activities continued as the organization moved in a new direction to pro-
cure American air crew for training in the BCATP.  The number of experienced
pilots available in the U.S. was decreasing for two reasons.  First, the RCAF
was no longer in desperate need of instructors and staff pilots for its air train-
ing program, so the air force set higher standards for American candidates to
meet.  Furthermore, as the war progressed and the likelihood of American par-
ticipation increased, the demand in the U.S. for this same group of airmen was
increasing as well.  In February 1941, Group Captain J.L.E.A. de Niverville
(Director of Air Force Manning) suggested that the CKC might begin looking
for American men who could be sent through the BCATP as air crew trainees.
The Minister of Defence for Air, C.G. Power, did not approve of this new man-
date since there was still a large number of Canadians waiting to enter the
RCAF and commence training.  As summer arrived, Stuart Armour (managing
director of the DAA) noted the dwindling numbers passing through the CKC
and decided to pursue another approach that would prolong the need for the
committee’s services.  When the CKC predicted it would be producing no more
than five or six experienced pilots a week for the RCAF, Armour decided to
approach air force officials about the possibility of recruiting trainees.  At the
request of Armour, Air Commodore Robert Leckie (Acting Chief of the Air
Staff) called a meeting of RCAF officers on 9 July 1941 to discuss the issue.36
At this meeting, the Chief of the Air Staff confirmed that the need to find
instructors and staff pilots was “daily becoming of less importance to the RCAF
....  The continuance of its [the CKC’s] activities upon the present scale would
not be justified on the basis of sending up only thirty pilots per month.”
Armour suggested that the committee could find a new raison d’être by find-
ing a supply of air crew.  Group Captain J.A. Sully (Acting Air Member for
Personnel) was in support of this plan. Not only did he tell the meeting that the
35 Douglas, 636-7; “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities
of the Clayton Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File
181.003 (D3639); quote from April 1941 Clayton Knight Committee General Regulations,
DHH File 80/68 Part 28.
36 22 July 1941 letter, Stuart Armour (Managing Director DAA) to President and Directors of
DAA, DHH File 80/68 Part 44; “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and
Statistics of Activities of the Clayton Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian
Aviation Bureau”, DHH File 181.003 (D3639).
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CKC “should not be allowed to disintegrate”, but he also recommended that
“the time had come when it was necessary for the RCAF to secure air crew
trainees in the USA in substantial numbers.”  The RCAF officers at the meet-
ing agreed to seek the Minister’s approval of the CKC’s procuring 2500
American air crew by 1 September 1941.  The Minister did not consent to the
new change outright, but he did approve Armour’s going to Washington to
explore the American government’s reaction to this new plan.37
On 11 July, Frederick King, the CKC’s legal adviser, met with members of
the DAA to discuss the air crew scheme.  He advised extreme caution in mak-
ing sure that nothing was done contrary to American laws. Securing air crew
trainees was definitely of a different nature than offering employment to
already trained pilots.  Presidential announcements to the press on 24 June 1941
did make it clear “that any man wanting to join the Canadian or British armed
forces had a perfect right to do so, subject to the limitations of certain statutes
with regard to oaths of allegiance to foreign rulers and to recruiting for foreign
armed services in [the United States].”38 Nonetheless, isolationist sentiment
still had to be taken into consideration.  Despite the fact that members of the
CKC (Knight and Colonel Harold Fowler) declared themselves willing to take
the risk and face the consequences of running afoul of American law, the legal
adviser stressed that “they should not place themselves in jeopardy if only for
the reason that to do so would destroy the usefulness of the committee, quite
aside from the fact that they might also embarrass the President.”  He felt that
contacting graduates of the Civil Pilot Training Plan (CPTP) by mail and
informing them of Canada’s need for air crew was an acceptable methodology,
as long as great care was exercised in the letters’ wording.  Frederick King
thought perhaps the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) could spread, by word
of mouth to CPTP graduates, the fact that Canada would welcome Americans
into its air force.  King offered more hints as to how CKC policy could be
shaped.  Seeing as foreign governments were not allowed to help Americans
financially in making their way to other countries to enlist, the committee could
not pay for the potential recruits’ travel expenses.  Nevertheless, the legal
adviser believed there was a way around this issue: “there would not ... be any
37 18 June 1941 letter, Stuart Armour to President and Directors of DAA, DHH File 80/68 Part
44; “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities of the
Clayton Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File
181.003 (D3639); “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF
Personnel History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7; quote from 22 July
1941 letter, Stuart Armour to President and Directors of DAA, DHH File 80/68 Part 44.
38 F.J. Hatch, “Recruiting Americans for the Royal Canadian Air Force 1939-1942” in Aerospace
Historian 18.1 (Spring-March 1971), 16, DHH File 71/192; “Recruiting in the United States
of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF Personnel History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III,
DHH File 74/7.
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objection to the Canadian government’s making a reimbursement of traveling
expenses, but in order to protect the Clayton Knight Committee from possible
embarrassment, any grant made to the trainees by the Canadian government
should not be called a traveling allowance.”39
Officials of the CAA and CPTP were very receptive of the suggestions
when they met with Stuart Armour on 12 July.  They believed that 2,500 civil
pilot training graduates willing to enlist in the RCAF could easily be found.
Mr. O.P. Howard (a CAA Inspector) and Mr. G. Andrews (a CPTP Supervisor)
were willing to spread the word about the RCAF’s need if permission to do so
was given by the CAA.  Two days later, Armour and Fowler proceeded to meet
with Mr Robert Hinckley (Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air) to get the
CAA’s official pronouncement on the air crew procurement scheme.  Hinckley
declared himself “fully in sympathy with [the] plan for securing air crew
trainees in the United States, but he could officially go no further then to tell
those of his subordinates immediately concerned that [the CKC’s] efforts had
his blessing.”  One such subordinate, Mr John Morris, was willing to provide
the committee with the names and addresses of students who graduated from
the CPTP primary course in 1940 and 1941.  Morris would also include the con-
tact information for 674 CPTP Coordinators and Flight Contractors providing
flying instruction.  With these, Morris suggested that the committee could con-
tact potential candidates directly and inform them that the RCAF had openings
for men willing to undertake air crew training and overseas service.  Morris did
warn, though, that “there was a considerable body of isolationist sentiment in
the United States and that it was rather more dangerous then it had been a few
months ago because the United States was now closer to being at war and the
isolationists were more desperate as a consequence.”40
Armour’s trip to Washington had been extremely successful.  With a little
imagination – and much caution – the committee’s legal adviser and the CAA
and CPTP officials all felt that American air crew could be secured without
breaking the letter of American laws.  Even Major-General Arnold of the army
and Rear-Admiral Towers of the navy approved of the committee’s plan to
39 “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities of the Clayton
Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File 181.003
(D3639); first quote from “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF
Personnel History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7; second quote from
22 July 1941 letter from Stuart Armour to President and Directors of DAA, DHH File 80/68
Part 44.
40 “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities of the Clayton
Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File 181.003
(D3639); first quote from 22 July 1941 letter from Stuart Armour to President and Directors
of DAA, DHH File 80/68 Part 44; second quote from “Recruiting in the United States of
America” Chapter 11 of RCAF Personnel History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH
File 74/7.
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approach CPTP graduates.  Consequently, the Canadian government revised the
CKC’s mandate in August 1941 to include recruiting Americans for air crew
training.41 With the advent of this changed mandate, Homer Smith recom-
mended to the Air Member for Personnel that the DAA and the CKC be
absorbed into one organization called the Canadian Aviation Bureau (CAB).
On 27 August, the Air Member for Personnel forwarded this recommendation
to the Deputy Minister for Air.  In consultation with the Minister of Defence for
Air, the Deputy Minister approved the reorganization on 2 September 1941.  All
CAB correspondence purposely made no reference to the RCAF and spoke
only of Canadian aviation so as to leave no trails of direct links between the
CAB and air force.42
Nonetheless, almost immediately after the Canadian government approved
securing American air crew trainees through the CAB, the State Department
faced a complaint about Canadians’ recruiting United States nationals.
American newspapers, on 12 and 13 August, carried the story that Democratic
Representative Walter Pierce (of Oregon) called for the American government
to “investigate reports that persons posing as representatives of the Canadian
Royal Air Force [sic] were seeking to enlist American flyers in Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho.”43 On 15 August, Hume Wrong, Chargé d’Affaires at the
Canadian Legation in the United States, contacted King, in his capacity as
Secretary of State for External Affairs, with more details about the complaint.
Apparently one CAB representative had sent a letter on 9 August 1941 inviting
Americans to enlist in the Canadian Coast Guards.  The parents of one recipi-
ent complained to Representative Pierce, who then voiced his constituents’
concerns to the State Department.  The State Department immediately sided
with the Canadian scheme, despite the fact that they felt this particular com-
mittee representative was very close to crossing the line of recruiting on
American soil.  The State Department told Pierce that “there is no legal barrier
to the enrollment of civilian personnel in the United States – and also that
41 Douglas, 638; 18 June 1941 letter, Stuart Armour to President and Directors of DAA, 22 July
1941 letter, Stuart Armour to President and Directors of DAA, DHH File 80/68 Part 44.
42 Hatch, 90, 92; “Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities of
the Clayton Knight Committee and its Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File
181.003 (D3639); “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF
Personnel History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7; 29 July 1941
Memorandum, W/C F.H. Smith to A/C H. Edwards (Air Member for Personnel), NAC RG 24
Volume 5368 File 45-10-3; 27 August 1941 memorandum, A/C H. Edwards (Air Member for
Personnel) to J.S. Duncan (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), 25 September 1941
memorandum, Homer Smith (Director CAB) to W/C Crabb (Director of Manning), NAC RG
24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-9.
43 “Says Canada Tries to Enlist US Flyers,” New York Sun, 12 August 1941; “Canadian
Recruiting in US to be Probed,” unnamed Washington DC newspaper, 13 August 1941 “US
Will Probe Bogus Air Agents,” New York Daily Mirror, DHH File 80/68 Part 50.
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Americans are free to go to Canada to join the armed forces if they so desire.”
The State Department even contacted the Department of Justice and recom-
mended that no further action be taken; this was “to forestall an attempt by Mr
Pierce to stimulate an investigation of the Clayton Knight Committee by the
Department of Justice.”44 Once again, the American Administration defended
the existence of Canada’s recruitment organization, and it excused and pro-
tected Canada’s stretching of American laws without hesitation.
The entry of the United States into the war, after Japan’s bombing of Pearl
Harbor in December 1941, brought a swift end to the CKC/CAB.  On 17
January 1942, the White House requested that Americans wanting to transfer
into American services be allowed to do so.  The next step was for the RCAF
to determine the future of the CAB’s work; at a meeting of RCAF officers on
22 January 1942, the representative for the Directorate of Personnel recom-
mended the cessation of recruiting Americans.  Consequently, the RCAF
decided that, effective 30 January 1942, American citizens “were no longer eli-
gible for appointment or enlistment in the Royal Canadian Air Force.”45 CAB
offices in Canada closed in February 1942; branch offices in the U.S. closed in
June 1942, although the headquarters in New York remained opened to write
letters of apology to Americans still inquiring about enlisting in Canada’s air
force; such inquiries continued to arrive until 1944.46
By the end of the war, 8,864 American nationals had been members of the
RCAF; 5,067 of these remained with Canada’s air force until the end of hostil-
ities.  Some 49,000 American airmen contacted the CKC/CAB for help; over
2,600 volunteers were sent north to Canada.  Of the 950 pilots directed to
Canada by the CKC, 763 were accepted to help with the BCATP.  The CAB
sent 1,805 individuals for consideration as possible air crew trainees; 1,455
were permitted to enlist and train in the RCAF.47 These numbers – and the
entire venture – would not have been possible without the combination of
Canadian determination and American support and tolerance.
44 15 August 1941 letter, H.H. Wrong (Chargé d=Affaires) to W.L.M. King (Secretary of State
for External Affairs), NAC RG 24 Volume 5368 File 45-10-5.
45 “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF Personnel History 10
September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7.
46 Douglas, 640-1; 26 December 1942 letter, Beatrice Thomas (Secretary CAB) to Richard
Landfear, DHH File 80/68 Part 30;  1 February 1943 letter, Thomas to R.H. Davison, 2
February 1943 letter, Thomas to James Dougall, 9 February 1943; letter, Thomas to RE
Brandon, DHH File 80/68 Part 22; 9 March 1944 letter, Thomas to John Arthur Sage, DHH
File 80/68 Part 30.
47 Douglas, 640-1; “Recruiting in the United States of America” Chapter 11 of RCAF Personnel
History 10 September 1939 - 1945 Volume III, DHH File 74/7; “Dominion Aeronautical
Association Ltd: History and Statistics of Activities of the Clayton Knight Committee and its
Successor the Canadian Aviation Bureau”, DHH File 181.003 (D3639).
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When the American pilot procurement scheme was first proposed, the
RCAF and the Canadian government (Clayton Knight and Homer Smith, civil
servants, ministers of the government, and the prime minister himself) knew
that the U.S. had declared itself neutral and that laws existed prohibiting the
recruitment of Americans on their home soil for service in foreign armed
forces.  Nevertheless, private citizens and the RCAF were bold enough to
devise such a scheme, and the Canadian government not only allowed the CKC
to go ahead, but the government was also privy to the committee’s fictitious
separation from the armed forces.  Despite the fact that American officials, on
a number of occasions, had to remind the Canadian government that the com-
mittee was branching off into illegal activities, the Canadian government, in the
end, did not terminate the committee, but instead let it evolve into an organiza-
tion that was securing American airmen as air crew trainees for combat duty
with the RCAF.  The Canadian government had the wherewithal to take full
advantage of the American administration’s sympathy for the Allied war effort.
The American government was also willing to tolerate Canada’s clandes-
tine activities because the Canadians were paying special attention to American
concerns.  The oath of allegiance was replaced with an oath of obedience so
Americans would not lose their citizenship if they joined the RCAF.  The CKC,
the DAA, and the CAB were created so that non-governmental agencies were
directly helping Americans make their way to Canada.  Committee officials
stressed the focus on providing information for civilian jobs so that attention
was drawn away from the reality of how easy it was for American fliers to be
directed toward the RCAF once they were in Canada.48 The committee and
Canadian government also heeded American legal advice as to the necessity of
finding less overt ways of advertising and providing travel funds.
The absence of the CKC episode from American secondary literature is a
fitting reflection of the attention paid to it in American primary sources.
Neither the Clayton Knight Committee nor the implications of American citi-
zens enlisting in the Canadian services were discussed in F.D. Roosevelt’s
office files.49 Despite the fact that Major-General H.H. Arnold (Chief of the
United States Army Air Corps) had been personally contacted by CKC mem-
48 “Seek Pilots Here to Fly Warplanes Across Atlantic” Minneapolis Tribune, 6 January 1941;
“Canada Wants US Fliers in Any Number, Says Envoy” Oakland Tribune 28 January 1941;
“Canada Seeks Aviators Here: Office Set Up in Boise to Give Information on Royal Air Force”
The Boise Capital News, 16 August 1941; “Hundreds of US Fliers Accept Canadian Posts”
Oregon Journal, 16 August 1941; DHH File 80/68 Part 50; 9 March 1944 letter, Beatrice
Thomas (Secretary CAB) to John Arthur Sage, DHH File 80/68 Part 30.
49 F.D. Roosevelt Diplomatic Correspondence, Confidential Files, and Subject File Series were
consulted; microfilm and published finding aid are located at the Royal Military College of
Canada’s library in Kingston, Ontario.
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bers, General Arnold’s memoirs do not mention any discussions.50 As Chief of
Staff, General George C. Marshall was ultimately in charge of the Army Air
Corps.  Despite being very interested in aviation – he himself could fly – his
personal papers make no mention of Canada’s request for air instructors nor the
impact competition for potential recruits might have on American air power.51
In his personal diary, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle Jr. only
once briefly refers to Canada’s search for American fliers.  In a memorandum
to himself dated 12 June 1940, Berle noted that Harry Hopkins (personal rep-
resentative and advisor to President Roosevelt)  asked “what we can do to help
fliers go to Canada;” Berle answered “this we could arrange.”  Berle did not
record any details about the request, about the State Department’s discussions,
or about the official response planned.  After replying in passing that the United
States could accommodate the request, nothing more was said in Berle’s diary,
not even when the CKC brought negative attention to itself by its over-zealous
conduct.52 This casual approach to the CKC subject clearly demonstrates the
committee’s existence and activities did not distress the Roosevelt
Administration.  The Secretary of the American section of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defence (an advisory body mandated to study maritime, land, and air
problems relating to the defence of the Western Hemisphere’s northern half)
was involved in warning officials of Canada’s Department of External Affairs
that the CKC was close to breaking American laws, but discussion about the
CKC’s conduct was never a part of the agenda of the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence meetings.53
50 American Air Power Comes of Age: General Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold’s World War II Diaries
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2002).
51 Microfilm and finding aids for The Papers of George C. Marshall – Selected WWII
Correspondence are located at the Royal Military College of Canada’s library in Kingston,
Ontario.  Also consulted – Larry Bland, George C. Marshall: Solider of Peace (Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 1997).
52 Adolf A. Berle Jr Diary – the original and microfilm are located at the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library at Hyde Park, New York.
53 Permanent Joint Board on Defence Agenda 1941-1953, NAC RG 24 Volume 8067 File 1270-
15-2; Permanent Joint Board on Defence Recommendations 1942-1954, NAC RG 24 Volume
8067 File 1270-15-4; Permanent Joint Board on Defence 1940-1947, NAC RG 24 Volume
5174 File 15-1-204 Parts 1, 2; Permanent Joint Board on Defence – Coordination of Aviation
Training Programs Canada-United States 1942-1943, NAC RG 24 Volume 5366 File 45-9-26.
The only reference found to American fliers participating in Canadian training schools
occurred on 23 December 1941 when the Board discussed the effect U.S. belligerency would
have on RCAF aviation training programs.  It was decided that American citizens still in train-
ing would complete their courses, that Canada would cease accepting any more Americans,
and that Americans wishing to transfer to American services would be allowed to do so as long
as the transfers did not impair Canada’s war effort.  See 23 December 1941 Memorandum,
NAC RG 24 Permanent Joint Board on Defence 1940-1947, NAC RG 24 Volume 5174 File
15-1-204 Part 1.
226
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2004 REVUE DE LA S.H.C.
chajournal2004.qxd  12/01/06  14:12  Page 226
It must be remembered that the U.S. was not overly concerned with conti-
nental defence, seeing as Canada was its neighbour and Great Britain was its
ally.  Once it was accepted that the United States would reach naval parity with
Great Britain, tensions between the rising New World power and the
Commonwealth dissipated, as did the possibility of war between Great Britain
(or Canada) and the United States.  The establishment of arbitration procedures
with the signing of the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, the renunciation of war
as an instrument of foreign policy in the 1928 Pact of Paris, and the naval lim-
itations agreed to in the Washington Treaties of 1921-2 also helped stabilize
relations on the North American Continent.54
American foreign policy of the mid-1930s was taken up with the formation
of cooperation amongst the twenty-one American republics in the Western
Hemisphere and the restoration of healthy international trade.55 According to
Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles in 1936, 
the United States, by joining forces with its fellow democracies of the Western
Hemisphere [could] provide an example – first in cooperating toward the
removal of the fundamental causes which lead to war, and secondly, in per-
fecting the machinery for the arbitration and conciliation of controversies
when they arise – that example will have a powerful effect upon the history of
the rest of the world, and will strengthen and supplement the efforts of the
League of Nations and of all other peace agencies.56
In 1940, Welles articulated his government’s belief “that one of the surest safe-
guards against war [was] the opportunity of all peoples to buy and to sell on
equal terms.”57 As long as participation in another world war was still not def-
inite, the American government used diplomatic rhetoric as the logical and
well-reasoned course to world peace.
Nevertheless, the Roosevelt Administration did not wait until the outbreak
of war in Europe to begin planning the continental defence of North America.
As early as 14 August 1936, the president publicly pledged that the U.S. would
defend Canada in time of threat.  At Chautauqua, New York, Roosevelt
announced, “our closest neighbours are good neighbours.  If there are remoter
54 12 November 1935 “Requirements of Canadian Defence – a Review of the Present Position”
by Major-General E.C. Ashton (Chief of General Staff), DHH 74/256 Imperial Conference
Data.
55 Dziuban, 161.
56 “The Way to Peace on the American Continent,” Address by Sumner Welles (Assistant
Secretary of State) Before the Maryland Federation of Women’s Clubs (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 15 April 1936), 7.
57 “Our Foreign Policy and National Defense” Address by Sumner Welles (Assistant Secretary of
State) Before the Foreign Affairs Council (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 28 September 1940), 5.
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nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know
that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighbour.”  Two years
later, on 18 August 1938, President Roosevelt gave another pledge on defence
solidarity. In a speech given in Kingston, Ontario, Roosevelt promised, “the
Dominion of Canada is a part of the sisterhood of the British Empire.  I give to
you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if dom-
ination of Canadian soil is threatened by another empire.”  On 20 August 1938,
at Woodbridge, Ontario, Canada’s Prime Minister King reciprocated the
pledge: “We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of
these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from
attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and
that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue
their way either by land, sea, or air, to the United States across Canadian terri-
tory.”  These promises were institutionalized in the Ogdensburg Agreement of
August 1940 and the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.58
Along with pursuing Hemispheric cooperation and defence, the American
State Department was preoccupied with avoiding being drawn into the European
conflict and with working within the limitations of the country’s neutrality
laws.  The fact that so little official attention was paid to the CKC is actually
consistent with other small, but significant, actions the Roosevelt
Administration authorized so as to be able to help the Allied war effort while
public opinion kept the United States from officially participating in the war.
In August 1939, when it was clearly obvious that war in Europe was imminent,
President Roosevelt considered some devious tactics that would stall any neu-
trality proclamation and arms embargo, thus allowing the British and French a
few extra days to purchase American manufactured goods.  Roosevelt sug-
gested to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle that a flaw should be placed
deliberately in the neutrality proclamation; hence, the Attorney General would
have to return the proclamation to the State Department for redrafting.  It was
expected to take a day or so before the proclamation could be forwarded in its
revised format to the Attorney General again.  President Roosevelt calculated
“that it would take at least five days after hostilities before the neutrality procla-
mation could go into effect.”  When Berle suggested that an additional
twenty-four hours could be added to the process by sending the revised neu-
trality proclamation to the Interdepartmental Committee again for review, “the
President grinned.”  Berle made a notation in the margin of his diary that “This
we did not do.  Better to play straight.”  Nevertheless, the mere consideration,
by the President, of such a delay tactic clearly shows the administration’s desire
to help the Allies any way it could.59
58 Dziuban, 3-4.
59 26 August 1939, Adolf A. Berle Jr Diary.
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President Roosevelt’s October 1939 correspondence with Lord
Tweedsmuir (Canada’s Governor General) reveals that the President was trying
to get a bill passed that would repeal the arms embargo.  While he was waiting
for the bill to go through Congress, he was “walking on eggs” and “saying
nothing, seeing nothing, and hearing nothing.”  The President’s quandary arose
from the fact that he wanted his personal friends, Lord and Lady Tweedsmuir,
to come to Hyde Park for a visit.  Nonetheless, Secretary of State Cordull Hull
believed such a visit to be inadvisable:
As the head of a belligerent state and a man well known in this country, it
would seem to be quite impossible for him to ‘slip down inconspicuously’,
even to Hyde Park....  The press, I feel sure, would learn of his visit, and any
attempt of its being inconspicuous would only increase the amount of specu-
lation as to his purpose.  Such publicity, I feel sure, would be used to
advantage by the administration’s opponents to the repeal of the arms
embargo.
Consequently, Roosevelt deferred the invitation, telling his friend, “I think that
the bill has a good chance of going through within the next two or three weeks,
and when that time comes, it will be not only wholly fitting but ‘all to the good’
to have you and Lady Tweedsmuir come down for a weekend.60 By September
1940, the Roosevelt Administration felt less inhibited about vocalizing its posi-
tion on the European War. Although still bound by the declaration of neutrality,
the government had clearly taken sides in the war.  According to Assistant
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, “it is the policy of your government, as
approved by the Congress of the United States, and, I believe, by the over-
whelming majority of the American people, to render all material support and
assistance, through the furnishing of supplies and munitions, to the British gov-
ernment and the governments of the British dominions in what we hope will be
their successful defense against armed aggression.”61
Canada was not the only recipient of American fliers for the war effort.
The fall of 1941 found the Roosevelt Administration agreeing to send more
Americans to help the Chinese air force.  The Chinese government had previ-
ously arranged a pilot training program in the United States.  Seeing as
graduates were not expected to be ready for combat until the summer of 1942,
the Chinese government had arranged to hire 100 American pilots and 181
60 19 September 1939 Cordull Hull (Secretary of State) memorandum to President F.D.
Roosevelt, 5 October 1939 President F.D. Roosevelt letter to Lord Tweedsmuir (Governor
General of Canada), F.D. Roosevelt Diplomatic Correspondence, Reel 3, 278-9, 284.
61 “Our Foreign Policy and National Defense” Address by Sumner Welles (Assistant Secretary of
State) Before the Foreign Affairs Council (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 28 September 1940), 14.
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American ground crew to serve immediately.  Because the United States would
be delivering 269 pursuit planes to China, and because there was an immediate
need to replace casualties in the original 100 fliers procured, the American gov-
ernment was willing to accept resignations of any army or navy pilots and
ground crew wanting to volunteer to help the Chinese air war effort.62 Turning
an almost blind eye to the CKC’s recruiting of Americans for Canada’s air force
was much less involved than providing planes to the Chinese and inviting
American airmen to resign from American military service to help the Chinese.
The American tolerance of the CKC was clearly in keeping with American
foreign policy and the desire of the Roosevelt Administration to circumvent the
United States’ neutrality laws.  Repeatedly, the State Department protected the
CKC from prosecution; repeatedly, American legal advisers suggested creative
– but acceptable – ways to bend American laws; and repeatedly, the President
expressed his support for the committee’s activities and existence.  The
American administration did not see Canada’s surreptitious actions (and disre-
gard for American law) as a threat to the American government or to
cooperative Canadian-American relations.  The Canadian government did not
see its accommodation of American concerns or its bold participation on the
world stage as a threat to Canadian sovereignty.  The Clayton Knight
Committee is an example of the power and influence Canada’s government can
have continentally and internationally when the country stands on firm princi-
ples, creates bold policies, and pursues both with unwavering pride and
determination.  The story of the Clayton Knight Committee also demonstrates
that it is not a mere episode in the history of Canadian-American relations.  The
greater context of the Canadian-American relationship, and American foreign
policy historiography for that matter, need to be reconsidered in light of what
the CKC escapade reveals about this relationship and the two countries’ atti-
tudes toward participation in the Second World War.
62 30 September 1941 letter, Harry Hopkins (Presidential Advisor) to F.D. Roosevelt, 30
September 1941 letter, F.D. Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy; 2 October 1941 letter, Henry
Stimson (Secretary of War) to Roosevelt; 3 October 1941 letter, Lauchlin Curre to President
Roosevelt, F.D. Roosevelt Confidential Files, Reel 8, 933, 934, 936, 938.
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